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IV 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
At bottom, this case concerns whether an engineer or surveyor's lien priority is afforded 
from commencement of any "professional services" under a contract related to a development 
project, or if such services must be performed on site to be lienable. The Defendant-
Counterdefendant-Cross Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant Integrated Financial Associates 
("IF A"), a lender, and the District Court impose an "on site" requirement. Defendant-
Counterclaimant-Cross Claimant-Appellant Stanley Consultants, Inc. ("Stanley") disagrees. 
Another Idaho State District Court Judge and the U.S. Chief Federal District Judge Winmill have 
recently issued decisions questioning the analysis employed by the District Court in this case, 
and held engineers enjoy priority based upon the first day that professional services commenced. 
The unal?biguous and broad language of Idaho Code §§ 45-506 and 45-501 describing 
the broadest range possible of services for which an engineer or surveyor can lien, combined 
with the complete absence in that language grafting on a requirement that priority only be 
afforded from the date of first professional services on site, compel the conclusion that priority is 
afforded from the first such work done. Indeed, § 45-506 expressly provides that a 
materialmen's lien is preferred to any lien or mortgage "which may have attached subsequent to 
the time when the ... professional services were commenced to be furnished." Section 45-501 
describes "professional services" as including items that clearly can occur off site, such as 
"prepar[ing] or furnish[ing] designs, plans, plats, maps, specifications, drawings, surveys, 
estimates of cost" as opposed to "on-site observation or supervision." 
ApPELLANT'S BRIEF - 1 
The District Court's decision was in error, and warrants reversal and a decree establishing 
the priority date of Stanley's lien as the first day Stanley commenced to furnish off-site 
professional services, June 26, 2007. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This consolidated case is the result of several individual cases dealing with common 
claims for nonpayment against the developer of the Summer Wind at Orchard Hills residential 
and golf course development in Canyon County, Idaho. Numerous parties made claims against 
the developer and pursued lien claims. The cases were consolidated. Throughout the course of 
the District Court proceedings, several parties were found to be in default or their liens deemed 
invalid. Thus, the remaining relevant lien interests that were actually addressed by the Court 
were those of Hap Taylor, Stanley, and IFA. These last persons standing, so to speak, comprise 
an excavation and roadway contractor whose liens include road and infrastructure work 
throughout the entire project (Hap Taylor), an engineering firm who worked a golf course 
clubhouse (Stanley), and a lender for the project (IF A). The thirteen page "register of actions" 
for this case illustrates the voluminous pleadings involved. Fortunately, most of the pleadings 
are not relevant to the appeal by Stanley. The relevant course of proceedings for purposes of 
Stanley's appeal follows. 
On April 22, 2008, Plaintiff-Cross Respondent Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc., d/b/a Knife 
River ("Hap Taylor") filed a Complaint for Foreclosure and Claim of Lien ("Complaint,,)l 
seeking to foreclose its two materialmen's liens that were filed for nonpayment related to 
I R. Vol. I, p. 14. 
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building development and contracting work it conducted on property in Canyon County, Idaho.2 
IF A, along with certain other named defendants, filed its Answer. to Hap Taylor's Complaint on 
July 7, 2008.3 Stanley's lien on this project is on land related to a clubhouse on a common area 
lot within the subdivision,4 and thus overlaps with Hap Taylor's lien claims. Stanley filed its 
Answer, Counterclaim and Crossclaim to Hap Taylor's Complaint on July 17,2008.5 Stanley's 
counterclaims and crossclaims sought to validate and establish the priority date of Stanley's lien 
against all interested parties. The cases were consolidated on March 2, 2009.6 
Hap Taylor filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on December 9, 2009, seeking to 
foreclose its two materialmen's lien claims.7 IFA also filed its own Motion for Summary 
Judgment on December 9, 2009,8 seeking to strike down the validity and/or priority of Hap 
Taylor's lien claims.9 Stanley then filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on December 10, 
2 The property Hap Taylor sought to foreclose on contains property that is also subject to both 
Stanley's materialmen's lien claim and IF A's deed of trust. 
3 R. Vol. I, p. 69. 
4 R. Vol. I, p. 119 (legal description ofStanIey's lien), 33 (note 2 on Plat), Vol. IX, 1518. 
5 R. Vol. I, p. 102. 
6 R. Vol. I, p. 74. 
7 R. Vol. II, p. 305. 
8 IF A filed a prior Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on December 7, 2009, seeking to 
foreclose on the lien interests of Defendant Extreme Line Logistics, Inc ("Extreme Line"). The 
District Court ultimately concluded that Extreme Line's lien was invalid for failure to timely file 
a civil action for enforcement, and also that the lien of Defendant PMA, Inc. ("PMA") was 
invalid. See Order on Motionsfor Summary Judgment, R. Vol. VI, p. 967. 
9 R. Vol. III, p. 473 
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2009, seeking an order as to the validity and amount of Stanley's lien, and that Stanley's lien was 
superior in time and priority to IF A's deed of trust interest 1 0 
IF A opposed Stanley's summary jUdgment and filed its Memorandum in Opposition on 
December 24, 2009. 1l IFA argued, in its opposition, that Idaho Code § 45-506 only allowed 
Stanley's lien priority to relate back to the first time Stanley performed actual physical work on-
site for the property at issue, rather than the first time Stanley provided engineering and project 
administration services under Stanley's contract to improve the property subject to its lien 
claim.12 IFA also filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Hap Taylor's summary judgment 
motion on December 24,2009. 13 
Stanley responded to IFA's opposition by filing a Reply to Integrated Financial 
Associated, Inc. 's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on December 13, 2009. 14 In its 
reply, Stanley explained that Idaho Code § 45-506 specifically intended to give a lien right to 
engineers for any authorized professional service, and that the priority of Stanley's lien claim, 
under that statute, should relate back to the first day Stanley began providing professional 
services under its contract 
10 R. VoL IV, p. 631; R. VoL IV, p. 632. Stanley's Motionfor Summary Judgment also sought 
an order that the liens of Extreme Line and PMA were invalid, which the District Court 
ultimately granted in its April 13, 2010, Order on Motions for Summary Judgment. See Order 
on Motions for Summary Judgment, R. VoL VI, p. 967 
11 R. VoL VI, p. 760. 
12 R. VoL V, p. 767. 
13 R. Vol. V, p. 796. 
14 R. Vol. VI, p. 854. 
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A hearing was held on the motions for summary judgment on March 3, 2010, and the 
District Court later entered its Order on Motions for Summary Judgment on April 13, 2010 
("Order,,).15 With regard to the priority date of Stanley's materialmen's lien, the District Court 
denied Stanley'S Motion for Summary Judgment, agreeing with IFA, and interpreted the 
language of Idaho Code § 45-506 to allow an engineer's claim of lien to relate back only to the 
first date actual physical work was conducted on the property at issue-a holding Stanley 
believes is in error and contradicts the plain language of Idaho Code § 45-506. 
IF A sought reconsideration, on August 18, 2010, but only of those portions of the Order 
relating to Hap Taylor's lien claims, and several subsequent pleadings were filed, both by IFA 
and Hap Taylor, regarding the reconsideration request. 16 Hap Taylor then filed a Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment on December 16, 201017, which was followed by IFA's Second Motion 
for Reconsideration on December 30, 2010 18, and MotiQnfor Continuance Pursuant to LR.C.P. 
56(f) on the same day l9. None of these pleadings involved Stanley's materialmen's lien claim. 
After a series of pleadings regarding Hap Taylor's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Hap Taylor filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment, on June 6, 2012,20 and, after 
15 R. Vol. VI, p. 967. 
16 R. VoL VI, p. 996. 
17 R. Vol. VII, p. 1167. 
18 R. Vol. VIII, p. 1223. 
19 R. Vol. VIII, p. 1228. 
20 R. Vol. IX, p. 1448. 
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exchanging additional pleadings with IF A, a subsequent Second Motion for Entry of Judgment, 
on September 19, 2012?1 
Because of the posture of the case, namely that no request for summary judgment had 
been made by IF A against Stanley, but that the parties now knew the District Court's position on 
the law and the parties had no dispute on the material facts, Stanley, Hap Taylor, IF A and others 
22executed, and Stanley filed, a Stipulation for Reconsideration and Entry of Certified Judgment 
on September 26,2012 ("Stipulation,,).23 The Stipulation set forth the agreed upon, relevant and 
undisputed facts that (1) Stanley has a valid unopposed lien on the property at issue, (2) IF A only 
contested the determination of Stanley's date of priority claiming that Stanley's work performed 
off-site was insuffiCient to establish the engineer's lien priority, (3) the first date Stanley began 
performing off-site work on the property under its professional services contract was June 26, 
2007, while the date Stanley began physical work on-site was July 19,2007, and (4) IFA has a 
valid deed of trust on the property at issue, with a priority date equal to recording in the real 
property records.24 The Stipulation further requested, in order to avoid additional unnecessary 
pleadings and delay, that the District Court reconsider its Order and enter a final, certified 
appealable judgment denying Stanley's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting IF A's 
Motion for Summary Judgment based on the District Court's decision that the priority date for an 
21 R. Vol. IX, p. 1490. 
22 As a matter of convenience, Stanley refers herein to IF A's deed of trust which is the most 
senior debt instrument on the Property, but notes for the record that more junior debt instruments 
exist, such as Geneva Equities, who is also represented by IFA's counsel. See, e.g., R. Vol. IX, 
f. 1518 (stipulation grouping IFA and others collectively as "IFA"). 
3 R. Vol. IX, p. 1517. 
24 R. Vol. IX, p. 1519,14. 
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engineer's lien, for purposes of applying Section 45-506, is the date actual work on the 
improvement or structure at issue commenced.25 That Stipulation specifically provided "Stanley 
does not hereby agree with the action taken by the Court, but is merely agreeing that the 
undisputed facts in this case do not allow Stanley to establish priority under the law as found and 
fonnulated by this Court-a holding that Stanley believes is in error." 
The District Court entered a Certified Judgment on Stanley Consultants, Inc. 's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, based on the Stipulation, on October 16, 2012?6 Stanley then filed its 
Notice of Appeal, from the October 16, 2012, judgment regarding its lien priority, on November 
26, 2012.27 IFA filed its Notice of Appeal on December 6, 2012, regarding whether the District 
Court erred in its determinations of Hap Taylor'S lien claims as set forth in the District Court's 
I 
October 26,2012 judgment on Hap Taylor's claims?8 
Also on December 6, 2012, this Court issued an Order Remanding tq District Court to 
remand Stanley's appeal to the District Court because the October 16, 2012 certified judgment 
did not qualify as a final judgment without analysis or a record of prior proceedings.29 
In light of the remand, Stanley contacted the clerk of this Court to inquire as to the status 
of the pending appeals and as to whether any action from the District Court was necessary in 
order to proceed. Stanley was informed that the entire appeal was stayed and that the District 
25 R. Vol. IX, p. 1519,14 & p. 1521. 
26 R. Vol. IX, p. 1538. The District Court later also entered a Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure related to Hap Taylor's lien claims on October 26,2010. See R. Vol. IX, p. 1543. 
27 R. Vol. IX, p. 1552. 
28 R. Vol. IX, p. 1584. 
29 R. Vol. IX, p. 1592. 
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Court needed to issue a judgment in the case without analysis or prior proceedings.3o Thus, in an 
attempt to move the proceedings forward, Stanley circulated a second stipulation to Hap Taylor 
and IF A with a draft final judgment, without analysis or prior proceedings, which complies with 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(a) and 58(a) for an appealable judgment.3 ! However, in the 
meantime, the District Court, sua sponte, entered an Order Clarifoing Determination on 
Reconsideration After Remand and Judgment on March 15, 2013 ("Reconsideration Order"), 
while Stanley'S proposed stipulation was being circulated.32 In that sua sponte March 15,2013, 
Reconsideration Order the District Court "dismissed Stanley Consultant's cross-claim for a 
determination that its lien is superior and prior to the [IF A] deed of trust .... ,,33 
In response to the District Court's March 15, 2013, sua sponte, Reconsideration Order, 
which seemed to contradict the parties' StipUlation relative to Stanley's lien, Stanley filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration of March 15, 2013, Order and Judgment on March 2S, 2013,34 
asking the District Court to reconsider and, instead, enter a judgment including language that 
Stanley has a valid lien with a priority date of July 19,2007 and otherwise preserving Stanley's 
right to appeal based on Stanley's perception the District Court had incorrectly interpreted and 
applied the law relative to the priority date.35 Stanley then filed a Stipulation for Entry of 
30 Supp. R. p. 22. 
3 lId. 
32 Supp. R. p. 22-23; R. Vol. IX, p. 1594; R. Vol. IX, p. 1609. 
33 R. Vol. IX, p. 1610. 
34 Supp. R. p. 15. 
35 June 19,2007 is the date Stanley first performed actual physical work on the property at issue 
and not the date Stanley first began to provide professional services under its contract. Stanley 
requested that this language be included in the District Court's judgment for purposes of appeal 
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Judgment on April 23,2013, signed by counsel for both Hap Taylor and IFA, agreeing to the 
relief sought by Stanley in the Motion for Reconsideration.36 A hearing was held on August 8, 
2013 regarding Stanley's March 28, 2013, Motion for Reconsideration and the April 23, 2013 
stipulation.37 The District Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration at the hearing and 
entered the final Judgment, as requested by the parties in the April 23, 2013, Stipulation, on 
August 8, 2013, providing, in relevant part: 
That the priority date of Defendant Stanley Consultants, Inc.' s lien 
at issue in this lawsuit, filed on February 22, 2008, ... , for the 
purposes of applying Idaho Code Section 45-506, is July 19, 2007, 
is the date actual physical work was actually conducted within the 
boundaries of the legal description of the property at issue in this 
lawsuit, and not the earlier day that Stanley commenced to furnish 
professional services under its contract for the project at issue?8 
Stanley filed its First Amended Notice of Appeal on August 16, 2013,39 appealing the 
August 8, 2013 Judgment holding that the priority of an engineer's lien under Idaho Code § 45-
506 relates back only to the first date actual physical work was performed on-site at the property 
in question, rather than the first date services, which may be off-site, were performed and 
provided as contractually authorized. 
so that Stanley may appeal the priority date and the District Court's interpretation and 
application of Idaho Code § 45-506. 
36 Supp. R. p. 44. 
37 Supp. R. p. 61. 
38 Supp. R. p. 70. 
39 Supp. R. p. 82. 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case presents a legal question of statutory interpretation, and the key facts are not in 
dispute and are in fact the subject of two stipulations.4o On June 18,2007, Stanley entered into a 
"PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AGREEMENT" with L222-2 ID Summerwind, LLC 
("Summerwind"), the property developer, to provide engineering services in the improvement of 
the real property commonly known as the Summerwind at Orchard Hills Subdivision 
("Property"). 4 1 That contract provided for work including a topographical map sufficient to 
design the golf club building, parking lot and drainage facilities, as well as designing and 
preparing a grading and drainage plan for the club house and parking facilities, and a potable 
water line and gravity flow sanitary sewer connection.42 Most importantly, that 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AGREEMENT described those services to include project 
administration services, which are described as "initiat[ing] the project including setting up 
project files, preparing budgets and schedules.,,43 Shortly after signing the PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICES AGREEMENT, on June 26, 2007, Stanley began furnishing labor, materials, and 
engineering services to improve the Property pursuant to the contract with Surnmerwind.44 
Stanley began work constituting on-site physical improvements to the property on July 19, 
40 See Stipulation/or Reconsideration and Entry o/Certified Judgment, R. Vol. IX, p. 1517, and 
Stipulation/or Entry 0/ Judgment, Supp. R. 44. 
41 R. Vol. V, p. 672, ~~ 3 & 5, p. 676. 
42 R. Vol. V, p. 678. 
43 R. Vol. V, p. 678. 
44 R. Vol. V, p. 672, ~6; see also R. Vol. IV, p. 639; R. Vol. V, p. 693, ~ 5, R. Vol. V, p. 698 
(6/26/07 labor entry for project administration). 
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2007.45 The Deed of Trust pursuant to which IFA claims an interest in the Property was 
. recorded in the real property records of Canyon Country, Idaho on July 13, 2007, as Instrument 
Number 2007048605.46 
Stanley performed all of its obligations under the PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 
AGREEMENT and ceased performing professional engineering services for the Property on or 
about January 9, 2008, before filing its materialmen's lien.47 Summerwind continually failed to 
pay the amount due on the open account with Stanley, and Stanley was not fully compensated for 
the professional engineering services it proviQed to improve the Property.48 
In light of Surnmerwind' s nonpayment, Stanley duly recorded a Notice and Claim of Lien 
on February 22, 2008, in the real property records of Canyon County, Idaho, as Instrument 
Number 2008009213, in the amount of $26,185.25 ("Lien") pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 45-501, 
et seq.49 Interest continues to accrue on this Lien amount. 
There is no dispute as to the validity of Stanley's Lien. Stanley recorded and pursued a 
valid claim of lien against the Property consistent with Idaho Code §§ 45-501 & 507.50 In its 
45 R. Vol. IX, p. 1519, ~ 4. 
46 R. Vol. IV, p. 641, ~ 11. 
47 R. Vol. V, p. 673, ~~ 7 & 8. 
48 R. Vol. V, p. 673, ~~ 9 & 10. 
49 R. Vol. IV, p. 653, ~ 4; see also R. Vol. IV, p. 658-660. 
50 Although not relevant to this appeal on the priority of Stanley's lien claim, the undisputed 
facts confirm that Stanley has a right to lien under Idaho Code § 45-501, which states, in relevant 
part, "[E]very person performing labor upon, or furnishing materials to be used in the 
construction, alteration, or repair. .. Of [who] otherwise improves any land ... has a lien upon the 
same for the work ... done or professional services or materials furnished." Idaho Code § 45-501. 
Stanley validly exercised its right to lien consistent with Idaho Code § 45-507 by filing its claim 
of lien within ninety (90) days after the completion of the services provided. Stanley provided 
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Order, the District Court agreed that no party has challenged the validity of Stanley's Lien.51 
Further, the parties stipulated to the validity of Stanley's Lien in the September 26, 2012, 
stipulation, filed with the District Court, stating Stanley has a valid lien, for a valid amount, 
consistent with the provisions of Idaho law. 52 Thus, this appeal presents a simple legal question 
regarding the priority date of Stanley's Lien. The parties have even agreed to the two possible 
dates for the priority date of Stanley's Lien depending on this Court's determination of 
applicable law: the first day Stanley commenced off site work on the Property pursuant to its 
Professional Services Agreement was on June 26, 2007, and the first day Stanley began actual 
services to improve the Property pursuant to the contract with Surnmerwind until January 9, 
2008, and then recorded its Claim of Lien on February 22, 2008, which is well prior to the 
expiration of the ninety-day period to record. R. Vol. V, p. 673, ~ 8; R. Vol. IV, p. 653, ~ 4. 
Idaho Code § 45-507 also demands that every lien claim contain a "statement of ... demand," the 
"name of the owner or reputed owner" of the property, the name of the person or entity for which 
services were furnished, and a "description of the property to be charged with the lien." Idaho 
Code § 45-507. Stanley'S Lien illustrates that Stanley complied with every requirement 
necessary for its claim to be valid by containing a demand for payment of the amount due, a 
statement that the owner or reputed owner is Summerwind, a statement of Stanley'S labor, and a 
legal description of the Property. R. Vol. IV, p. 658. Idaho Code Section 45-507 also requires 
notice to' ensure validity of a lien claim. A copy of the claim of lien "shall be served on the 
owner or reputed owner of the property." Idaho Code § 45-507. Copies of Stanley'S Lien were 
sent to all reputed owners via certified mail, return receipt requested. R. Vol. IV, p. 661; R. Vol. 
IV, p. 654, ~ 6. The requirements for claim validity were clearly met and these material facts are 
undisputed. Finally, Idaho Code § 45-510 requires that proceedings to foreclose a materialmen's 
lien must be commenced within six (6) months from the date the lien is recorded. Stanley 
. recorded its Lien on February 22, 2008 and filed its Answer, Counterclaim and Crossclaim to 
foreclose on the Lien on July 17, 2008 which is within the six-month required time frame. R. 
Vol. I, p. 102. Stanley took the required steps to create a valid and enforceable lien on the 
Property, and the only issue for this appeal is whether, under Idaho Code § 45-50~, the priority 
date of Stanley's Lien relates back to June 26, 2007, the date Stanley first began to provide 
professional services under the contract with Surnmerwind, or July 19, 2007, the date Stanley 
first began physical work on-site at the Property. 
51 R. Vol. VI, p. 974. 
52 R. Vol. IX, p. 1519, ~ 4. 
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physical work on-site for the Property was July 19,2007.53 The only remaining legal question is 
whether the language of Idaho Code § 45-506 setting the priority date of Stanley's Lien as the 
time when "professional services were commenced to be furnished," means the first day of 
providing professional services under the contract or the first day of on-site professional services 
work at the subject property. 54 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court erred in denying Stanley's Motion for Summary Judgment 
based on its decision that the "priority date," for an engineer's lien. under Idaho Code 
Section 45-506, is the date of actual professional services on the land or structure at issue 
(i.e., that "actual work" demands physical work on the property) rather than the date the 
engineer commenced to furnish any professional services whatsoever. 
2. Whether the District Court committed-error in its analysis and application of Idaho Code 
§§ 45-501, 45-506 and 45-512 to the facts of this case and thus, erred in denying 
Stanley's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. Whether the District Court erred in determining that the priority date for Stanley's Lien 
related only to the first day Stanley began physical work on the project site; 
4. Whether the District Court's decision, and interpretation ofthe Idaho statutes cited above, 
that the priority date for a lien of an engineer related back only to the date of actual 
53 Id 
54 Idaho Code § 45-506. 
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physical work on the subject property contradicts and conflicts with the proper 
interpretation of Idaho.law, an interpretation adopted by other Idaho district level courts; 
5. Whether the District Court was in error in determining that work had to be done on the 
structure or land itself by Stanley before anything existed to which Stanley's Lien could 
attach. 
III. COSTS ON APPEAL 
Stanley hereby requests, and is entitled to, its costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 40, and Idaho Code § 12-10 1. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court employs the same 
standard used by the district court. 55 This Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of 
the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the 
record in favor of the party opposing the motion. 56 Summary judgment is appropriate and shall 
be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ,,57 A party opposing a motion for summary jUdgment 
55 Sprinkler Irrig. Co. Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 695, 85 P.3d 667, 671 
(2004) (citing Baker v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 748, 979 P.2d 619, 621 (1999». 
56 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641,644 
(2006)(citing In/anger v. City o/Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2002». 
57 IDAHO R. CIv. PRO. 56( c). 
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must set forth specific facts showing there is a "genuine issue" about a "material fact.,,58 When 
parties file opposing motions for summary judgment, the applicable standard of review remains 
the same. 59 However, in the circumstances presented by the present case, wherein there is no 
genuine dispute about the underlying facts in the context of an appeal of a summary judgment, 
only as to the interpretation of the statutory law applicable to those facts, "[t]he interpretation of 
a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." Keybank Nat 'I Ass'n 
v. PAL L LLC, Idaho __ , P.3d __ , 2013 WL 5488814 (October 3, 2013) (quoting 
Carrier v. Lake Pend GreWe Sch. Dist., 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655,658 (2006». 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER A LIEN ATTACHES WHEN AN ENGINEER COMMENCES 
THE FIRST PROFESSIONAL SERVICES IN CONNECTION WITH A BUILDING OR 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, OR IF ATTACHMENT IS DELAYED UNTIL PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICES COMPRISING ACTUAL CONSTRUCTION ON THE PROPERTY COMMENCE. 
There is no dispute in this case that the priority date for the IF A Deed of Trust attached to 
the Property is the date that document was recorded, July 13, 2007. The dispute is whether 
Stanley's Lien priority under Idaho Code § 45-506 relative to that Deed of Trust is measured 
from the first date it performed any professional services related to this land and building project 
pursuant to its PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AGREEMENT (June 26, 2007) or the first time 
58 Tuttle v. Sudena Indust., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150,868 P.2d 473 (1994). 
59 Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 897,204 P.3d 532,537 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009); See 
also Intermountain Eye & Laser Ctrs., P.L.L.C v. Miller, 142 Idaho 218, 222, 127 P.3d 121, 
125 (2005); Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C, 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 
(2004); Intermountain Forest Mgmt. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 
921, 923 (2001); Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 206, 998 P.2d 1118, 1119 (2000); 
Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1986). 
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professional servIces associated with construction were actually conducted on-site at the 
Property (July 19, 2007). In the later case, its lien .priority is inferior to IF A; in the fonner case, 
Stanley has the superior lien priority. 
Of course, Stanley talces the position that the first date it perfonned professional services 
related to this building and land deVelopment should establish the priority date when its lien 
attached. Stanley's conviction in this regard is finnly anchored in (a) the history of the 1971 
amendment adding lien rights for engineers and surveyors; (b) the plain language of the 
amendment that leaves no room for contrary interpretation; (c) another Idaho state district 
Judge's and a Federal District Judge's shared reading of this plain language; (d) recent Idaho 
authority regarding the nature of the property interest liened; and (e) the mandatory liberal 
interpretation required in favor of lien claimants. 
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1971 AMENDMENT ESTABLISHES A LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT TO AFFORD LIEN PRIORITY DATING FROM THE EARLIEST OFF SITE 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES IN CONNECTION WITH A BUILDING OR DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECT-REGARDLESS OF THE LOCATION OF SUCH SERVICES. 
Idaho has sought to protect the rights and interests of materialmen since its materialmen's 
statute was first enacted in 1893. Over the years, that statute has undergone a series of 
amendments to expand the scope of protection offered, and class of people protected, for those 
who participate in improving real property. The amendments add protection for additional 
classes of claimants and confinn the underlying purpose of the statute-to compensate those 
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who provide labor or materials for the construction of a building.6o In fact, the generally 
recognized goals of materialmen's liens are to promote equity and prevent unjust enrichment.61 
Idaho's first mechanic's lien statute became law in 1893.62 Section 45-501 of the statute 
was amended in 1951 to extend the lien right to anyone "who grades, fills in, levels, surfaces or 
otherwise improves any land. ,,63 And in 1971, the Idaho State Legislature again saw fit to amend 
the materialmen's lien statue to expand the protection and provide engineers and surveyors with 
a lien for professional services. The two revised sections most relevant to these proceedings are 
Idaho Code § 45-501, which creates a right to lien, and Idaho Code § 45-506, which establishes 
the liens as preferred claims and defines their priority over mortgages and other encumbrances 
(language added by 1971 amendment is Uflderlined): 
[§ 45-501 Right to lien.] Every person performing labor upon or 
furnishing materials to be used in the construction, alteration or 
repair of any mimng claim, building, wharf, bridge, ditch, dike, 
flume, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad, wagon road, aqueduct to 
create hydraulic power or any other structure, or who grades, fills 
in, levels, surfaces or otherwise improves any land, or who 
performs labor in any mine, and every professional engineer or 
licensed surveyor under contract who prepares or furnishes 
designs, plans, plats, maps, specifications, drawings, surveys, 
estimates of cost, on site observation or supervision, or who 
renders any other professional service whatsoever for which he is 
60 This Court acknowledged the equitable purpose of Idaho's materialmen's statute in Pierson v. 
Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 41,593 P.2d 590,593 (1975). 
61 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Mechanics' Liens §4 (2013). 
62 1893 Sess. Laws, ch. 1, § 1, pp. 49-50. 
63 Prior to the 1951 amendment, the statute created a lien for persons performing labor upon or 
furnishing materials to be used in the construction, alteration or repair of any mining claim, 
building wharf, bridge, dike, flume, tunrIel, fence, machinery, railroad, wagon road, aqueduct to 
create hydraulic power or any other structure, and those that perform labor in a mine or mining 
claim. See generally, 1951 Sess. Laws, ch. 199, § 1, p. 422-23. 
ApPELLANT'S BRIEF - 17 
legally authorized to perfonn in connection with any land or 
building development or improvement, or to establish boundaries, 
has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or professional 
services or materials furnished .... 
[§ 45-506 Liens preferred claims.] The liens provided for in this 
chapter are preferred to any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance, 
which may have attached subsequent to the time when the 
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work done, or 
materials or professional services were commenced to be furnished 
64 
Thus, the Idaho Legislature acknowledged that the work of engineers and surveyors may involve 
"any professional service whatsoever" and included examples such as "preparing and furnishing 
designs, plans, plats, maps, specifications, drawings, surveys, estimates of cost, on-site-
observation or supervision, or . . . any other professional service whatsoever for which he is 
legally authorized .... ,,65 Idaho State District Judge Patrick H. Owen found this legislative 
history as significant in his recent decision in In Re Tamarack Resort Foreclosure And Related' 
Proceedings.66 Judge Owen was specifically asked to reconsider prior rulings he had made 
regarding architects' lien rights in that case in light of Judge Kerrick's decision in the present 
case. Judge Owen saw the legislative history and the 1971 change as signifying that 
"[p ]rior to this change, the priority was measured from the time the 
construction commenced, work was done on the building, or 
materials supplied to the site. By providi~g that an engineer's lien 
relates back to the time that professional services were first 
commenced, the Court concludes the legislature intended to 
64 1971 Sess. Laws, ch. 91, § 1, pp. 196-98 (emphasis indicates language added by 1971 
amendment). 
65 Idaho Code § 45-501. 
66 See Addendum to this Brief, attaching a full text copy of Judge Owen's Memorandum 
Decision and Order in In Re Tamarack Resort Foreclosure And Related Proceedings. 
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provide for a lien priority for an engineer that was not connected to 
actual construction activities." 67 
The Tamarack case dealt with an architect, which Judge Owen equated to an engineer under 
Idaho Code §§ 45-501 and 506. He ruled that the lien has priority from the date services were 
first provided.68 Judge Owen reasoned, "[t]he significant work of an architect, much like the 
work of an engineer, is almost always in the planning and development stages of a project, prior 
to any construction activities.,,69 The change to the statute made by the Legislature, when 
considered against the backdrop of the existing right to lien, inescapably leads to the conclusion 
that the 1971 amendment recognized as valuable and lienable the preconstruction work of 
engineers and surveyors. Work that often would not be lienable prior to 1971 because it was 
preparatory, design, or other development work routinely performed off site-before the actual 
construction begins and labor and materials are furnished to the property. 
C. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF IDAHO CODE §§ 45-501 AND 45-506 CREATES A LIEN RIGHT 
FOR STANLEY WITH A PRIORITY DATE OF STANLEY'S FIRST DAY OF WORK. 
Even if the background against which the 1971 amendment was enacted is ignored, on its 
face the Idaho materialmen's statute with respect to an engineer's or surveyor's date of priority 
of that lien is unambiguous. Idaho Code § 45-506 provides that an engineer's lien takes priority 
for "professional services" at the time those "professional services were commenced to be 
furnished." There is no other language limiting or qualifYing the time or place that priority-
establishing services commence-the statute simply allows priority to relate to when the services 
67 See Addendum, Memorandum Decision and Order, pp. 8-9. 
68 See Addendum, Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 10. 
69 Id 
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begin. Idaho Code § 45-501 gives insight into the meaning of that phrase under § 45-506, 
"professional services"-which the Idaho legislature saw fit only to use in connection -with 
engineers and surveyors right to file mechanic's liens_ Idaho Code § 45-501 states: 
every professional engineer or licensed surveyor under contract 
who prepares or furnishes designs, plans, plats, maps, 
specifications, drawings, surveys, estimates of cost, on-site 
observation or supervision, or who renders any other professional 
service whatsoever for which he is legally authorized to perform in 
connection with any land or building development _ .. 70 
Idaho Code § 73-113 directs that "[tJhe language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and 
ordinary meaning," and that "[wJhere a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of 
the legislature shall be given effect without engaging in statutory construction" because "[t]he 
literal words of a statute are the best guide to determining legislative intent.,,71 This Court has 
"consistently adhered to the primary canon of statutory construction that where the language of 
the statute is unambiguous, the clear expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and 
there is no occasion for construction.,,72 If a statute is not ambiguous, the Court has a duty to 
follow the law as written, even if it is socially or otherwise unsound, and it is up to the 
Legislature not the Court to correct any such unsoundness, if necessary.73 Put another way: 
70 Idaho Code § 45-501 (emphasis added). 
71 Idaho Code § 73-113. 
72 Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai Cnty., 98 Idaho 925,928,576 P.2d 206,209 (1978) (citing 
State v. Riley, 83 Idaho 346,349,362 P.2d 1075, 1076-1077 (1961)). 
73 Anstine v. Hawkins., 92 Idaho 561, 563, 447 P.2d 667, 679 (1968); John Hancock Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Neill, 79 Idaho 385, 319 P.2d 195 (1957). 
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"[w]hen interpreting statutes or ordinances, this Court construes words and phrases according to 
context. Words must be given their plain, obvious, and rational meanings." 74 
Because the Idaho Legislature used the term "on site" specifically related to observation 
and supervision, their intent to create a lien right for the other listed off site professional services 
is obvious. Also significant is the choice of words indicating that these engineering services may 
be any "in connection with any land or building development" (emphasis added) and that even 
"preparing" to furnish such off site items as plans, plats, specifications, etc., is a professional 
service. No other lien claimant has such lien rights, as evident from the fact that other persons 
can only lien for "labor upon" or "furnishing materials to be used in the construction of." Both of 
these descriptions contemplate actually rendering work at or delivery of materials to the job site. 
"Preparing" and "in connection with" a "land or building development," on the other hand, 
contemplates work being done in an office or other site-remote location, including preparatory 
work connected to a contemplated development before even one shovel of dirt is turned. 
All of this weight of the express definition of "professional services" found in Idaho 
Code § 45-501 necessarily comes to bear in the use of that phrase in Idaho Code § 45-506 
describing the priority of such a lien vis a vis other encumbrances, wherein it is provided that: 
[t]he liens provided for in this chapter ... are preferred to any lien, 
mortgage or other encumbrance, which may have attached 
subsequent to the time when [a] the building, improvement or 
structure was commenced, [b] work done, [c] equipment, materials 
74 Lamar Corp. v. City o/Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 42, 981 P.2d 1146, 1152 (1999). 
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or fixtures were rented or leased, or [d] materials or professional 
services were commenced to be furnished ... 75 
Put simply, the engineer's lien is preferred and prior to any mortgage that attached subsequent to 
the time the professional services were commenced. This plain language is unambiguous and 
leaves no room for interpretation. The term "commence" so plainly means, and lends itself to no 
other interpretation other than, "to begin," that it is not defined in Black's Law Dictionary. 
"Professional services" on the other hand, is clearly afforded a meaning in this context by the 
Idaho Legislature earlier in the materialmen's lien chapter of Title 45, in Idaho Code § 45-501. 
The reference t6 "who [under contract] renders any other professional service whatsoever ... in 
connection with any land or building development" implicitly defines the types of things that 
come before it as being examples of "professional services." Things such as "prepar[ing] or 
fumish[ing] designs, plans, plats, maps, specifications, drawings, surveys, estimates of cost, on-
site observation or supervision." Notably, the adjective "on-site" only modifies two of the 
examples of "professional services," while the other examples such as preparing plans, plats, 
maps andlor drawings, are not the type of activities that necessarily require presence at a job site 
and within the common realm of understanding are activities typically done at an engineer's 
office. Yet, these other examples are still within the statutory list of what comprise "professional 
services." Further, Section 45-501 links professional services to services "under contract," 
implying that the parties themselves may contract for and agree upon what activities constitute a 
"professional service," just like, for instance, the PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AGREEMENT 
75 Idaho Code § 45-506 (emphasis and material in brackets added). 
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and its providing for project administration, including setting up project files, and preparing 
budgets and schedules, as professional services. Glaringly absent, on the other hand, is any 
express reference to a requirement that professional services be rendered on site in order to be 
"commenced. " 
A final notable point about the plain, obvious and rational meaning ascribed by the 
legislature to the term "professional services" from the use and context of that phrase within 
Section 45-501 is the reference at the end of that section to the activities comprising professional 
services being performed "in connection with any land or building development." No other 
reference to lienable work within the materialmen's lien statute includes a reference to general 
development activity. The clear import of such a reference is that in defining professional 
services, the legislature was not thinking only of engineers and surveyors performing work on a 
particular plot of land or a building, but doing zoning, entitlement or other "development" type 
work, commonly done off site. 
Given the context and use of "professional services" and "commenced" within the 
relevant statutes, and the complete absence of any reference tying the priority of an engineer's 
lien to actual work commencing on the property itself, the only reasonable interpretation of 
Idaho Code § 45-506 is that the lien priority is equal to the time the contracted professional 
services began with respect to a particular land or building development, without regard to the 
location of where that work was accomplished. There is no additional language to qualify the 
attachment other than at the commencement of professional services, nor is there any additional 
requirement that only services occurring on the property site shall establish the priority date. The 
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language of the Idaho Code establishing the priority of the engineer's lien is clear, and this Court 
has regularly recognized that when the statutory language is unambiguous, the Court does "not 
construe it but simply follows the law as written.,,76 
D. INTERPRETING IDAHO CODE § 45-506 AS CONFERRING LIEN PRIORITY BASED ON THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF THE FIRST PROFESSIONAL SERVICES FITS BEST WITH EXISTING 
IDAHO LAW-IFA OVERREACHES IN DIVINING A MAJORITY RULE IN THE UNITED 
STATES REQUIRING ON SITE VISIBLE WORK. 
IF A operates from an assumption that there is a general rule respecting all classes of 
materialmen's lien claimants that work or materials have to be visible on the job site for such 
lien claimants to take priority over lenders' recorded mortgages,77 but Stanley submits that 
position is greatly overstated and ignores the specific language of Idaho statutory law and 
holdings of Idaho courts. Even ignoring the history and the unambiguous statutory language 
regarding the 1971 amendment language affording professional engineers their lien rights, Idaho 
case law to date only applies what IF A claims to be the majority rule (work or provision of 
materials visible on site before ,priority afforded) with respect to actual material suppliers. 
Further, this limited application of the alleged national majority rule has its roots in the express 
language of Idaho's unique statutory scheme, not in general common law principles. 
76 State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007); See also Credit Bureau of 
Lewiston-Clarkston, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 117 Idaho 29,31,784 P.2d 885, 887 (1989) 
("Where the meaning of a statute is clear, we are confined to follow that meaning and neither add 
to nor take away by judicial construction."); Moon v. Investment Bd, 97 Idaho 595, 596, 548 
P.2d 861, 862 (1976) ("where a statute or constitutional provision is plain, clear, and 
unambiguous, it speaks for itself and must be given the interpretation the language clearly 
implies."); Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 339, 393 P.2d 35, 37 (1964) ("We must follow the 
law as written. If it is socially or economically unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not 
judicial."). 
77 R. Vol. V, p. 764. 
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1. Pacific States and Ultrawall Are Entirely Compatible with the 
Proposition that Professional Services Consisting of Orf Site Work 
Are Immediately Lienable. 
Case law interpreting Idaho Code § 45-506 is scant. There is no Idaho appellate authority 
addressing the precise issue of an engineer's lien priority date under Section 45-506. Two prior 
decisions from this Court, Pacific States Savings, Loan & Building Co. v. Dubois, 11 Idaho 319, 
83 P. 513 (1905), and Ultrawall, Inc. v. Washington Mutual Bank, FSB, 135 Idaho 832, 25 P.3d 
855 (2001), have been cited and relied upon by the District Court to refute Stanley's argument. 
Neither case directly addresses the priority date of a lien for professional services. However, 
both cases do contain strong support for Stanley's position. 
In Pacific States, the question at issue was whether, under the 1905 version of what is 
now Idaho Code § 45-506, the lien claims of those perfonning labor or furnishing materials for a 
building construction all related back to the time any construction began, or whether each party's 
lien related back the date that party commenced perfonning labor or furnishing materials. 78 The 
Pacific States court concluded that Section 45-506, as written and codified in 1905, and when 
potentially intervening mortgages are involved, the priority of materialmen's liens should not all 
relate to construction on the property, but to "the time or date when the building was 
commenced, or the labor begun to work, or the materialman commenced to furnish the material, 
must be taken into consideration .... ,,79 Specifically, 
All liens for labor commenced and materials commenced to be 
furnished prior to recording said mortgages are prior to and 
78 Pacific States Savings, Loan & Building Co. v. Dubois, 11 Idaho 319,83 P. 513,513 (1905). 
79/d at 514. 
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superior liens to said mortgages, and the liens of all laborers for 
labor commenced, and materialmen for material commenced to be 
furnished, subsequent to the recording of said mortgages, are 
subordinate to said mortgages, when such work is done and 
material furnished by persons not theretofore connected with the 
construction of the building.8o 
Otherwise, if that was not the Idaho Legislature's intent, "why did not the Legislature simply say 
that all liens for labor and material furnished in the erection or construction or repair or change 
of a building took effect from the commencement of the construction of such building or such 
repair or change?,,81 The Pacific States Court also surmised that the Idaho Legislature: 
intended to make all liens for work commenced or materials 
commenced to be furnished after the recording of a mortgage 
subsequent and inferior thereto, especially when such work is done 
and materials furnished by persons who had no connection with the 
erection of the building until after the recording of the materials.82 
Thus, the only statement bearing on the present situation that can be drawn from Pacific States is 
that the Idaho Legislature intended the original version of § 45-506 to make all liens for work 
commenced or materials commenced to be furnished before the recording of a mortgage to be 
superior to that mortgage. Thus, with the addition of "professional services" as lienable work in 
the 1971 amendments, and the attendant priority for liens for such services attaching when 
"professional services were commenced to be furnished," liens for professional services 
commenced before the recording of a mortgage should be deemed superior under the 1905 
Pacific States holding and the clear language ofIdaho Code § 45-506 as amended in 1971. 
80 Id at 514. 
81 Id 
82 Id 
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The District Court, however, reasoned that Pacific States essentially locked in time the 
interpretation of Section 45-506 that there are only two classes of lien claimants, (1) those that 
are involved with the commencement of the erection of a building, and (2) those who begin work 
after the commencement of erection of the building. 83 This may have been a proper interpretation 
for the existing statute in 1905 and up until the time of the 1971 "professional services" 
amendment, but the amendment added a new class of lien claimants-engineers and surveyors-
and a new extensive definition of the "professional services" for which they may lien. 
In its sua sponte, March 15, 2013, Reconsideration Order, the District Court confirmed 
its interpretation that Idaho Code Sections 45-501 and 45-506 only allowing two classes of lien 
claimants, those that work on commencement of the structure to be built, and those that begin 
work after the structure is commenced. The District Court saw no reason to create a third 
category, which it erroneously asserted is not already in the statute, for a priority date based on 
work performed before any property improvements exist. 84 
The District Court's analysis ignores that since 1971, such a priority date has existed in 
Section 45-506 and 45-501 with respect to professional services. The amended statute clearly 
establishes lien priority when professional services were commenced to be furnished, and 
professional services, as discussed above, may entail off site engineering and surveying work 
typically done before the commencement of construction. The District Court also suggested that 
83 R. VoL VI, p. 979; R. VoL IX, p. 1604. 
84 R. VoL IX, p. 1604. 
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Ultrawall came to the same conclusion in interpreting Pacific States, and it is respectfully 
submitted that conclusion is in error. 
In Ultrawall, the Pacific States decision was challenged and upheld. The Ultrawall 
Court also assessed whether all materialmen's liens should relate back to the time work was first 
done on the project despite an intervening lender's deed of trust. Although the claimant in 
Ultrawall was a sheetrock company, it was alleging that its priority related all the way back to 
when the original engineering and design services had been provided by an engmeer. 
Ultimately, this Court decided to stay consistent with Pacific States and hold that a 
subcontractor's lien took priority from the date that subcontractor first furnished labor or 
materials to the property, and not the first date any work was done on the project. The District 
Court relied on Ultrawall's confirmation of Pacific States in its judgment against Stanley. 
However, Ultrawall is in fact harmonious with Stanley's position. 
The Ultrawall decision analyzed the current version of Section 45-506 in the same 
manner as in the Pacific States decision-segmented by the type of work being done as to when 
a particular lien claimant can first assert priority, saying: 
that the particular lien claimant must either [1] commence to 
furnish professional services such as engineering or surveying, 
[2] commence the physical construction of building, 
improvement or structure, or, [3] if that person or entity was not 
involved with either of the above activities, begin to work or 
furnish materials in order for that claimant's lien to attach. 85 
85 Ultrawall, Inc. v. Washington Mut. Bank, FSB, 135 Idaho 832, 836, 25 P.3d 855, 859 
(2001)(emphasis added). 
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Thus, Ultrawall took the original two classes of lien ~claimants set out in Pacific States for 
purposes of priority, utilized the same analysis as to when their liens attach, and added a third, 
new class, the 1971 "professional services" amendment class. In acknowledging above that (a) 
the commencement of physical construction or beginning to work or furnish materials was 
separate from (b) the commencement of professional services, this Court, in its Ultrawall 
decision, clearly understood that the attachment of liens upon commencing professional services 
clearly can occur separate and apart from the "physical construction" or the later "begin[ing] to 
work" or "furnishing materials" to the job site, If the priority for a professional services lien 
could not exist until construction began on the property, there would be no reason to identifY the 
commencement of professional services as a lien priority category separate from the 
commencement of construction or beginning to work or furnish materials. 
The Honorable B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge for the United States District Court 
for the District of Idaho, agreed with the above analysis in his 2011 Contractor's Equipment 
Supply Co. v. Prizm Group & Construction, LLC, Case No. 1:1O-CV-045-BLW, 2011 WL 
6002462 (D. Idaho Nov. 30, 2011) decision. Judge Winmill was faced with a similar question 
regarding an engineer's lien and interpretation of Idaho's lien priority statute. 86 He analyzed 
whether a lender's deed of trust has priority over an engineer's materialmen's lien when the 
engineer began and performed work on the subject property before the deed of trust was 
recorded, but made no visible physical improvements to the property until after the deed of trust 
86 Contractor's Equipment Supply Co. v. Prizm Group & Construction, LLC, 2011 WL 6002462, 
at *2 (D. Idaho Nov. 302011). 
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was recorded. Judge Winmill discussed the District Court's reliance on Ultrawall and indicated 
that the Ultrawall case "did not address a lien by: an engineer (or any professional for that 
matter).,,87 However, the court did point out the above-cited portion of the Ultrawall decision.88 
Judge Winmill used this three-tiered delineation to more easily interpret whether the language of 
Idaho Code § 45-506 (establishing lien priority when an engineer "commenced to furnish 
professional services") actually required tangible physical improvements on-site at the subject 
property. Judge Winmill concluded that the language does not require physical construction, and 
that the commencement of any authorized professional services would be sufficient to establish 
an engineer's lien priority date. 
Judge Winmill came to this conclusion by reasoning that had the statutory language 
required physical construction, "the Idaho Supreme Court would not have created separate 
categories for these two events in the Ultrawall decision." 89 Thus, there is a difference between 
the two circumstances. The lien priority for when a claimant "commenced to furnish 
professional services," under Idaho Code § 45-506, is the date the claimant performed any 
authorized services related to the subject property. This interpretation makes clear that the 
priority date for Stanley's Lien should be June 26, 2007, the date Stanley first began providing 
professional engineering services under the contract with Summerwind. 
87 Id. at *2. 
88 Id. at *3 (citing Ultrawall, Inc. v. Washington Mutual Bank, 135 Idaho 832,25 P.3d 855, 859 
(Idaho 2001». 
89 Id. at *3. 
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Idaho State District Judge Owen also utilized a similar analysis in his 2010 Tamarack 
decision. Judge Owen explained that in Ultrawall, this Court's rejection of the subcontractor's 
attempt to relate its lien back to the time anyone first worked on the project, "did not indicate 
that an engineer did not have a lien from when the engineer first furnished professional services," 
and that this "Supreme Court simply reiterated its prior ruling that a subcontractor providing 
labor or materials has priority from the date that the subcontractor first provide labor or 
materials, and that the subcontractor cannot bootstrap to the earlier priority date available to 
another lien claimant.,,90 Judge Owen concluded that, under Idaho law, the architect's lien for 
work, which is much like the work of an engineer in that it is "almost always in the planning and 
development stages of a project, prior to any construction activities," has priority from the date 
. fi 'd d 91 servIces were Irst pravI e . 
2. Idaho's Statutory Language Regarding Engineers and Architects is 
Unique and Distinguishable From General Materialmen's Lien Law 
of Other States. 
Both Judge Kerrick and IFA implicitly or expressly attempt to analogize Idaho's 
materialmen's statute to that of California and assume that the relevant portions of such statutes 
are essentially fungible across the nation.92 However, the materialmen's statutes among the 50 
90 See Addendum, Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 10 (emphasis added). 
91 Id. 
92 R. Vol. VI, p. 977; R. Vol. V, pp. 764-766; See also, Rebecca A. Rainey, Shaky Foundations: 
Engineers Rely On Questionable Priority Dates to Support Their Mechanic's Lien Claims, 53 
Advocate 29 (20 10) (counsel for IF A asserts "It goes without saying that mechanic's lien statutes 
vary widely between jurisdictions. Nevertheless, one thread that remains uniform is that there 
must be some mechanism to give competing encumbrancers notice of potential lien rights." 
(emphasis added)). 
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states "are notorious for the extent to which they vary from each other in their application and 
operation.,,93 And over time, the state statues "have undergone frequent amendment and 
considerable changes, often giving earlier decisions in a particular jurisdiction only a limited 
application.,,94 As discussed above, Idaho is no exception. The Idaho materialmen's law has 
undergone a series of amendments over the years and its precise language is different from the 
California statute Judge Kerrick referred to in her reasoning. Importantly, the purpose and goal 
of Idaho's materialmen's law "is to compensate persons who perform labor and provide 
materials for improvements to or upon real property. ,,95 Contrary to assertions by counsel for 
IFA, Idaho's materialmen's statutes were not created to ensure protection for lenders and other 
potential encumbrancers, but for the protection of persons performing labor and providing 
materials. One likely justification for this is that the provision of labor and materials-or in the 
case of engineers, professional services-typically enhances the value of the property at issue for 
all concerned, including lenders, and those providing this enhanced value justly deserve 
compensation. 
Judge Kerrick relied on her companson of Idaho' materialmen's lien statute to a 
California lien statute to conclude that the two are similar and the lien of an engineer in Idaho 
does not have priority until "the date actual work on the improvement or structure at issue 
93 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' Liens § 8 (2013). 
94 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' Liens § 10 (2013). 
95 Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, 151 Idaho 740, 744, 264 P.3d 
379,383 (2011). 
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commenced.,,96 In her Order, she referred to the California Supreme Court's analysis in Walker 
v. Lytton Savings and Loan Ass'n of Northern California, 2 Ca1.3d 152, 84 Cal.Rptr. 521,465 
P.2d 497 (1970), to identifY what she perceived as the key priority question for professional 
services lien-whether visible construction on the project had commenced prior to the recording 
of the mortgage or deed oftrust.97 
The Walker court interpreted the California materialmen's lien statute and found that, 
under California law, a bank's mortgage had priority over the architect's lien because the 
mortgage was recorded prior to any actual construction activities. However, the California 
statute analyzed in that case was distinctly different from the applicable Idaho statute in this case. 
In the California statute there is no express provision for professional services, and a lien for 
improvement work is preferred to a mortgage that attaches after commencement of the 
construction. The California statute analyzed in Walke.r read, in relevant part: 
The liens provided for in this chapter, except as otherwise ... 
provided, are preferred to any... deed of trust, or other 
encumbrance upon the premises and improvements ... which may 
have attached subsequent to the time when the building, 
improvement, structure, or work of improvement in connection 
with which the lien claimant has done his work or furnished his 
material was commenced, also to any... deed of trust, or other 
encumbrance of which the lien claimant had no notice and which 
was unrecorded at the time the building, improvement, structure, 
or work of improvement ... was commenced .... 98 
96 R. Vol. 6, p. 980. 
97 R. Vol. 6, p. 978. 
98 Walker v. Lytton Sav. And Loan Ass'n of N Ca, 2 Cal. 3d 152, 156, 465 P.2d 497 (1970) 
(quoting Section 1181 of the California Code of Civil Procedure) (emphasis in original). 
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This California statutory language is different from the Idaho materialmen's lien priority 
language and provides lien priority over a mortgage only if the mortgage was recorded after. the 
building and improvement work commenced. There is no reference to professional services in 
the California statute whatsoever, nor is there any acknowledgement that professional services 
entail preparatory and off site work, which is different from building or furnishing materials. 
Thus, the California statute and its judicial interpretation, on the point of priority for a 
professional services lien in Idaho, are not applicable or analogous to an interpretation of the 
Idaho statute regarding such lien priority. 
In his Tamarack decision, Judge Owen respectfully disagreed with Judge Kerrick's use of 
the California statute and the Walker case. He took a position that California's lien priority 
statute was different and not applicable to interpreting the Idaho lien priority statute regarding 
professional services. Judge Owen reasoned that the Idaho Legislature's 1971 amendment to 
Idaho's lien priority statute provided that "as between a mortgagee and an engineer, the priority 
of the engineer's lien related back to the date that 'professional services were commenced to be 
furnished,'" and that prior to the 1971 amendment the lien priority was measured "from the time 
that the construction was commenced, work was done on the building, or materials were supplied 
to the site.,,99 He concluded that by providing priority from the date professional services 
commence, the Legislature intended to create a lien priority for engineers "that was not 
d a1 .. " ,,100 connecte to actu constructIon actIVitIes. 
99 See Addendum, Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 8 
100 Id at 9. 
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In his Contractor's decision, Judge Winmill reasoned "that the Idaho Supreme Court 
would interpret I.C. § 45-506 to mean that an engineer who provided any professional services in 
connection with property before the deed of trust was filed would have a superior lien on the 
property," and denied the lender's motion for summary judgment seeking lien priority over the 
• 101 
engmeer. 
The Contractor's court also referenced Judge Kerrick's "determination that the key 
question regarding the priority of a mechanics lien . . . is whether visible construction 
commenced before the lender filed its deed of trust," and respectfully disagreed. 102 Judge 
Winmill recognized the difference between the California lien priority statute, together with the 
Walker interpretation, and the Idaho lien priority statute, and he found the District Court's 
reliance on a California law for guidance misplaced. In his decision, Judge Winmill noted the 
express, and important, provision in Idaho Code § 45-506 that a mechan~cs lien is "preferred 
over any mortgage which attached after 'materials or professional services were commenced to 
be furnished,'" and expressly stated "the California statute addressed in Walker does not contain 
[that] important language .... ,,103 
Thus, California's lien priority statute is easily distinguished from Idaho's lien priority 
statute, and no interpretation of the California statute can be used to apply and interpret the lien 
priority of an engineer's "professional services" in Idaho. 
101Id. at *3. 
102 Id. 
103 Id at *2. 
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3. Idaho Code § 45-512 Priority Ranking of Materialmen's and 
Mechanic's Liens Only Comes Into Play When there are no 
Intervening Liens or Encumbrances. 
Finally, Judge Kerrick's Reconsideration Order also erroneously focuses on reconciling 
Idaho Code § 45-506 with Idaho Code § 45-512. Idaho Code § 45-512 sets forth the priority 
ranking of different types of materialmen's liens in the event that there are competing 
materialmen's liens. 
However, § 45-506 and § 45-512 are not applied together when a non-materialmen's or 
mechanic's lien intervenes or breaks the ranks or classes. As this Court stated in Pacific States 
opening syllabus, the statutory provision ranking each class ofliens (now known as 45-512) only 
"apply to cases in which there are no intervening mortgage liens."I04 The present case deals with 
a materialmen's lien and a competing mortgage lien, as opposed to several competing 
materialmen's liens, and any interpretation and application of Section 45-512 is irrel~vant as the 
focus should only be on the priority language in Section 45-506. 
4. Beall Pipe is Rooted in the Express Language of the Statutory Scheme 
Describing Commencing Furnishing Materials On Site; However, the 
Statutory Scheme for Professional Services of Engineers Expressly 
Contemplates Off Site and Preparatory Design Work as Lienable. 
In opposition to Stanley's lien priority, IF A cited the Idaho Court of Appeals case, Beall 
Pipe & Tank Corporation v. Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 700 P.2d 109 (Id. Ct. 
App. 1985). IF A asserts the Beall Pipe case supports its position that work must be done on site 
before lien priority can attach, and that Stanley's off-site work is insufficient to establish lien 
104 Pacific States Savings, Loan & Building Co. v. Dubois, 11 Idaho 319,83 P. 513 (1905). 
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priority.105 IF A is mistaken and has misapplied the decision in Beall Pipe. The Beall Pipe court 
analyzed the priority of a lien for furnishing materials, as opposed to a lien for professional 
services. The lien in Beall Pipe was filed by a pipe company for supplying mainline irrigation 
pipe to the defendant. The court cited the priority language of Idaho Code § 45-506 that "the 
priority date of a lien for materials is the date materials 'were commenced to be furnished, '" and 
concluded the priority of a lien for materials related back to the date the materials were first 
fumished. 106 In further analyzing the "commenced to be furnished" language from the statute, 
the court determined that the language established priority as of the date the materials were first 
delivered to the site. IF A interpreted this decision to apply across the board and that any use of 
"commenced to be furnished" required on-site work in order to establish priority. However, the 
Beall Pipe decision is specific to a lien for furnishing materials. The on-site requirement with 
regard to furnishing tangible materials is reasonable because, unlike engineering services which 
can be furnished and commenced on-site or off-site, one cannot furnish materials for a project 
off-site of the project. Thus, the Beall Pipe court's conclusions that the phrase "commence to 
furnish materials" requires the furnishing of materials on-site has no bearing on whether 
Stanley's priority for commencing to furnish professional services can relate only to on-site 
work. For reasons set forth above, the language of §§ 45-501 'and 45-506 defining "professional 
services" is so clear that any interpretation of these statutes that superimposes an on-site work 
105 R. Vol. V, p. 764; R. Vol. VI, p. 976. 
I06Beall Pipe & Tank Corporation v. Tumac Intermountain, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 492, 700 P.2d 
109, 114(Id. Ct. App. 1985) 
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requirement for professional services would eviscerate much of the definition of "professional 
services. " 
E. IDAHO CODE § 45-501 's REFERENCE TO "LAND AND BUILDING DEVELOPMENT" 
EFFECTIVELY CONFERS THE STATUS OF AN IMPROVEMENT TO LAND ON OFF SITE 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES. 
According to Judge Kerrick's Reconsideration Order, "it is unclear how Stanley can 
assert that the priority date of a lien that attaches to an improvement can predate the existence of 
that improvement. ,,107 Although she noted there "does not appear to be any issue that Stanley is 
entitled to a lien for the pre-construction work," Judge Kerrick cited Idaho Code § 45-501 and 
concluded that Stanley cannot have a priority date before construction of an improvement is 
underway. However, this conclusion misinterprets the definition of what the lien may attach to 
under Section 45-501. Judge Kerrick erroneously interpreted the statute and concluded it 
requires actual construction before the lien may attach. The statute states, in relevant part: 
Every professional engineer or licensed surveyor who under 
contract who prepares or furnished designs, plans, plats, maps ... 
or who renders any other professional service whatsoever for 
which he is legally authorized to perform in connection with any 
land or building development or improvement, or to establish 
boundaries, has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or 
fi . I· ·al furn· h d 108 pro esslona servIces or maten s IS e .... 
Judge Kerrick emphasized the "has a lien upon the same" language in the above quotation and 
interpreted "any land or building development or improvement" together to require building and 
construction. Judge Kerrick essentially read "deVelopment" as meaning exactly the same thing 
107 R. Vol. IX, p. 1599. 
108 Idaho Code § 45-501 (emphasis added). 
ApPELLANT'S BRIEF - 38 
as "improvement." Rather, by stating both "land or building development," and "improvement," 
the Idaho Legislature was acknowledging potential for pre-construction, off-site development 
work and the lienability of the same against the land itself. The intentional use of several terms 
in the disjunctive sense indicates the terms are not meant to convey the same meaning. The term 
"improvement" is set apart from the "development" term and is meant to encompass work that 
actually physically results in an improvement to real property. But by including the term 
"development" as well the Idaho Legislature recognized that surveying and engineering work, by 
, 
their nature, are activities that enhance and improve the land upon which they are directed, 
regardless of any "improvement" to the physical real property. This is true even before any 
construction activity occurs on the land, because the work of "land or building development" 
often includes design work that facilitates later construction, i.e., later physical improvements to 
the real property. 
In Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, 151 Idaho 740, 264 
P.3d 379 (2011), this Court referenced Section 45-501 in its interpretation of Section 45-508's 
language regarding "improvements," and stated: 
Although "improvement" is not specifically defined in the lien law, 
such law has historically differentiated between improvements 
made on the land, such as buildings and structures, and work done 
to improve the land, itself, such as grading, filling in, and leveling. 
The section of the lien law that established basic lien rights, I.e. § 
45-501, clearly demonstrates this distinction. The section provides 
in pertinent part: 
Every person performing labor upon, or furnishing materials to be 
used in the construction, alteration or repair of any mining claim, 
building ... or any other structure, or who grades, fills in, levels, 
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surfaces or otherwise improves any land, ... has a lien upon the 
same for the work or labor done ... or materials furnished ... 
I.C. § 45-501 (emphasis added). It is obvious that the section 
creates two distinct types of liens-a lien against some form of 
structure, alternately referred to in later sections of the lien law as 
an " improvement," *745 **384 and a lien created in favor of one 
who improves the land, itself, by grading, leveling, and the like. 
1bis is true because of the use of the disjunctive "or." A person 
making the first type of improvement "has a lien upon the same," 
i.e., the improvement itself. On the other hand, a person who 
improves any land by grading, filling or leveling, obtains a lien 
against "the same," meaning the land. 109 
The Hopkins Court went on to hold that a landscaper had indeed worked on one lienable 
improvement to the land for the entire golf course project, not 13 separate lots because: 
Similarly, the work at issue in this case was governed by a single 
contract and billed on a project-wide basis. HPGC executed a 
contract with LV for the "[ c ]onstruction of all project components 
for an eighteen-hole golf course and practice range." There were 
not separate contracts created for each of the eighteen holes, and 
there was no separate contract for the driving range. Instead, the 
parties entered into a single contract for the construction of one 
final product and, accordingly, anticipated payment for that 
product as a whole. 110 
Applying this same reasoning here, "land and building development" must mean something 
different from "improvement." Stanley's professional services work was that of an engineer who 
did "land or building development." Stanley thus has a lien against the "same," i.e., a lien against 
the land and building development. In other words, for this type of professional services work, 
the Legislature has effectively determined that even in the absence of any physical work on the 
109 Hopkins at 744-45, 264 P.3d at 383-84. 
1I0 Id 
ApPELLANT'S BRIEF - 40 
land or structures on the land, the land itself is nevertheless improved by the rendition of off site 
professional services. There can be no other reasonable explanation for the use of the 
"development" term in § 45-501 in conjunction with "improvement," as all other explanation 
folds those two terms into synonyms. 
F. THE REQUIRED LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE LIEN STATUTES ALSO MANDATES 
INTERPRETING SECTION 45-506 TO AFFORD A LIEN PRIORITY DATE OF WHEN 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES COMMENCED, WITHOUT REGARD TO THE LOCATION OF 
PERFORMANCE OF THOSE SERVICES. 
Fundamentally, Idaho materialmen's liens "are to be liberally construed so as to effect 
their objects and to promote justice. "Ill And, such liens are to be construed in favor of the person 
performing the labor or services. 112 This Court has stated, "Idaho's mechanic's lien statute is 
constitutionally mandated (Idaho Const., art. XIII, § 6) and intended to be liberally construed in 
favor oflien claimants .... ,,113 This notion alone is sufficient to allow Stanley's priority to relate 
back to the date it actually began providing services under the contract-June 26, 2007. 
IllIt is this Idaho Supreme Court's "stated policy that lien statutes are to be liberally construed 
'so as to effect their objects and promote justice. '" Terra-W, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 
Idaho 393, 401, 247 P.3d 620, 628 (2010) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. First Security Bank of 
Idaho, 94 Idaho 489, 493, 491 P.2d 1261, 1265 (1971)); See also Chief Industries, Inc. v. 
Schwendiman, 99 Idaho 682, 685, 587 P.2d 823, 826 (1978); Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38,539 
P.2d 590 (1975); Ross v. Olson, 95 Idaho 915,523 P.2d 518 (1974); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. First 
Sec. Bank of Idaho, 94 Idaho 489, 493, 491 P.2d 1261, 1265 (1971) ("It is clear that in Idaho 
lien statutes governing mechanic's and laborer's liens are to be liberally construed so as to effect 
their objects and to promote justice."); Seafoam Mines Corp. v. Vaughn, 56 Idaho 342, 53 P.2d 
1166 (1936); Fairfax v. Ramirez, 133 Idaho 72, 77, 982 P.2d 375, 380 (Id. App. 1999). 
112 Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Sumpter, 87 P.3d 955, 139 Idaho 846 (2004). 
113 Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut.Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 397, 247 P.3d 620, 624 (2010) 
(citing Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38,41,539 P.2d 590,593 (1975)). 
ApPELLANT'S BRIEF - 41 
Such background must have infonned the Idaho Legislature's amendment of the 
materialmen's statute under the Idaho Code to expressly give a lien right to a professional 
engineer who "prepares or furnishes designs, plans ... specifications ... surveys, estimates of 
cost ... or renders any other professional service whatsoever for which he is legally authorized .. 
. ,,114 Thus, the Idaho Legislature deliberately accommodated professional engineers whose 
services are inherently different from a typical contractor providing on-site labor and supplies. 
The lien right, once established, is "preferred to any lien, mortgage ... which may have attached 
subsequent to the time when the ... professional services were commenced to be furnished."lls 
The priority date of the lien is the date services started. Certainly, the Idaho Legislature did not 
intend to give professional engineers the right to lien once they began preparing designs, 
specifications, cost estimates, or any other authorized "professional service whatsoever," yet 
withhold priority of that right until the engineer actually set foot on, and actually broke ground 
on, the property to be improved. Common sense dictates that the priority date for a materialman 
arises in tandem with the lien right, and for professional engineers, such date is when the 
planning, designing, or any authorized services are commenced under Idaho Code §§ 45-501.and 
45-506. There is no statutory language requiring professional services be actively on the 
property site before they qualifY for priority purposes. 
114 Idaho Code § 45-501 (emphasis added). 
lIS Idaho Code § 45-506 (emphasis added). 
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G. STANLEY IS ENTITLED TO ITS COSTS ON ApPEAL. 
Stanley requests, and is entitled to, its costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 
40, and Idaho Code § 12-101. Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a) provides that "[c]osts shall be allowed 
as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the 
Court." And, Idaho Code § 12-101 provides that "[c]osts shall be awarded by the court in a civil 
trial or proceeding to the parties in the manner and in the amount provided for by the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure." Stanley'S appeal in this matter falls within the purview of Idaho Appellate 
Rule 40(a) and Idaho Code § 12-101, and Stanley is entitled to its costs incurred in pursuing its 
appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Stanley respectfully requests this Court reverse the District 
Court's. decision that Stanley'S lien priority relates back only to July 19, 2007-the date physical 
work was performed on the property-and hold that Stanley's lien priority relates back to June 
26, 2007, the date Stanley commenced to furnish professional services. This Court should rule 
as a matter oflaw that June 26, 2007, is the valid priority date of Stanley's lien and that said lien 
stands prior to the recording ofIFA's deed of trust. Further, because all the information is in the 
record at this point and there is no issue as to the validity and amount of Stanley's lien, this Court 
should simply direct that the District Court enter a foreclosure decree in favor of Stanley 
consistent with this opinion. 
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DATED this 7th day of November, 2013. 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
BY~· 
Thomas . Dvorak 
Attorneys for Defendant -Counterclaimant-Cross 
Claimant-Appellant Stanley Consultants, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 7ili day of November, 2013, I caused to be served two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing via hand delivery to the parties of record in compliance with 
Idaho Appellant Rule 34( d). 
Thomas E. Dvorak 
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This matter is before the Court for consideration of a motion to reconsider filed by Credit 
, 
Suisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch (fol111erly known as Credit Suisse, Cayman Islands Branch) 
(Credit Suisse). For the reasons set forth below, the Court wiII deny the motion to reconsider. 
Background and Prior Proceedings 
EZA, P.c. d/b/a OZ Architecture of BouIder (OZ) provided professional architectural 
services on a number of construction projects for Tamarack Resort LLC (Tamarack), including the 
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Trillium Townhomes project. OZ recorded a number of mechanic's liens on June 28,2004. One 
2 
of those liens attached to Trillium Townhomes project property. On October 20,2008, OZ filed 
3 
an action as Valley County Case No. 2008-580C, seeking among other things, to foreclose its lien 
on the Trillium Townhome Project propelty. Credit Suisse was named as a defendant in this 
5 action. 
6 One of the defendants in that case filed a motion to dismiss OZ's foreclosure action 
asserting that an architect does not have the right to a mechanic's lien under Idaho law. In a 
Memorandum Decision and Order entered on September 14,2009, the Court ruled that an 
';! II archi tect whose plans are actually incorporated into a building has the right to a lien pursuant to 
Ie 
Idaho Code § 45-501. 
11 
Pursuant to a motion by Credit Suisse, on April 26, 2010, the OZ foreclosure action, 
12 
13 
Valley County Case No. 2008-580C was consolidated with the main Tamarack foreclosure 
proceeding, In Re Tamarack Resort Foreclosure and Related Proceedings, Valley County Case 
1S No.2008-114C. 
16 In three decisions entered June 15,2010 and June 16,2010, the Court ruled that the 
17 mechanic's lien of an architect will relate back to the date that the architect first provided 
18 professional services at the request of the owner. (See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 
19 
MHTN Architects, Inc. 's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Validity and Priority ofIts 
20 
Lien .. ,> over Credit Suisse Mortgages; Memorandum Decision and Order Re: EZA, P.C, D/B/A Oz 
21 
Architecture of Boulder's Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Lien Numbers 332702,332741, 
22 
23 
332742 and 332746; Memorandum Decision and Order Re: EZA, P.C., D/B/A Oz Architecture of 
24 Boulder's Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Priority ofIts Liens over Credit Suisse Mortgages.) 
25 
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On July 27,2010, Credit Suisse moved for reconsideration of these rulings and urged the 
Court to find that an architect's lien will relate back to the date that construction first commenced. 
In support of its motion, Credit Suisse referred the Court to a recent decision entered by District 
Judge Juneal C. Kerrick, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment entered on May 27, 2010 in 
T/711eS0I1 Construction, Inc. v. Needs Koch, LLC, e! al. Canyon County Case No. CV -2008-70 I 5C. 
The Court heard argument on this motion on August 11,2010. P. Bruce Badger (pro hac vice), 
Fabian & Clendenin, Salt Lake City, Utah, appeared and argued for Credit Suisse. Clay M. 
Shockley, Sasser & Inglis, Boise, Idaho, appeared and argued for MHTN Architects, Inc. Jolm K. 
10 I Olsen, Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP, appeared and argued for OZ. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Analysis and Discussion 
Priority disputes between a mechanic's lien claimant and a mortgagee are determined by 
Idaho Code § 45-506 which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The liens provided for in this chapter . . . are preferred to any lien, mortgage or 
other encumbrance, which may have attached subsequent to the time when the 
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work done ... or materials or 
professional services were commenced to be furnished. 
Idaho Code § 45-506. Thus, a mechanic's lien is preferred to a mOligage that attaches subsequent 
18 I to the events specified in the statute, i.e.: "the time when the building, improvement or structure 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
was commenced", "work [was] done", or "materials or professional services were commenced to 
be furnished." 
An early Idaho Supreme Court decision, Pacific States Savings. Loan and Building Co. 
V. Dubois, II Idaho 319, 83 P. 513 (1905), interpreted a prior version of Idaho Code § 45-506. In 
that case, the o'vvner contracted separately for the many phases of the construction of a building. 
After commencement of construction, the owner entered into two mortgages. Ultimately, the 
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owner defaulted in making the payments secured by the mortgages, and defaulted in making 
payments to the various laborers, materialmen and contractors. The trial court ruled that the liens 
of all of the mechanic and materialmen lien claimants related back to when construction first 
commenced, and thus, all lien claimants had priority over the subsequent l110ligagees. 
The Pac~fic States Court reversed and found that there were three possible priority dates 
for the mechanic and materialmcllliens, to wit: 1) those whose labor or materials were connected 
, I with the commencement of construction; 2) those whose work did not begin until after 
construction commenced; and 3) those whose materials were supplied after the commencement of 
I construction. The Court ruled that the mortgagees were subordinate to lien claimants whose labor 
or materials were connected with the commencement of construction. The Court also ruled that 
the l110ltgagees were subordinate to those lien claimants who first supplied labor or material after 
commencement of construction, but before the date the mOlt gages were recorded. However, the 
mortgagees had a superior priority to those lien claimants who supplied material and labor after 
commencement of construction, and after the date the mortgages were recorded. Id at 324-26. 
The Pacific States Court's interpretation was later challenged and upheld in Ultrawall, Inc. v. 
'Washington Mutual Bank, 135 Idaho 832, 25 P.3d 855 (2001). 
Idaho has had statutes dealing with mechanic's lien for more than a century. The first 
mechanic's lien statute became law in 1893. The original language of the Session Law provided: 
Every person performing labor upon or furnishing materials to be used in the 
construction, alteration or repair of any mining claim, building, wharf, bridge, 
ditch, dike, i1ume, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad, wagon road, aqueduct to 
create hydraulic power or any other structure, or who performs labor in any mine or 
mining claim, has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or materials 
furnished, whether done or furnished at the instance of the owner of the building or 
other improvement or his agent; and every contractor, sub-contractor, architect, 
builder or any person having charge of any mining or of the construction, alteration 
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or repair either in whole or in part, of any building or other improvement, as 
aforesaid shall be held to be the agent of and owner for the purpose of this chapter: 
Provided, That the lessee or lessees of any mining claim shall not be considered as I the agent or agents of the owner under the provisions of this chapter. 
, 1893 Sess. Laws, ch. 1, § I, p. 49-50. 1 
II 
II 
In 1951, the lien right was extended to any person who "grades, fills in, levels, surfaces or 
otherwise improves any land." The statute as amended in 1951 provided: 
Every person performing labor upon or fumishing materials to be used in the 
construction, alteration or repair of any mining claim, building, wharf, bridge, 
ditch, dike, flume, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad, wagon road, aqueduct to 
create hydraulic power or any other structure, or who grades, fills in, levels, 
sUlfaces or othenvise improves any land, or who performs labor in any mine or 
mining claim, has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or materials 
furnished, whether done or furnished at the instance of the owner of the building or 
other improvement or his agent; and every contractor, sub-contractor, architect, 
builder or any person having chmge of any mining or of the construction, alteration 
or repair either in whole or in part, of any building or other improvement, as 
aforesaid shall be held to be the agent of and owner for the purpose of this chapter: 
provided, that the lessee or lessees of ~my mining claim shan not be considered as 
the agent or agents of the owner under the provisions of this chapter. 
1951 Sess. Laws, eh. 199, § 1, p. 422-23 (emphasis indicates language added by 1951 
amendment). 
In 1971, the statute (now codified as Idaho Code § 45-501) was amended again to provide 
a lien right to engineers and land surveyors as follows: 
Every person performing labor upon or furnishing materials to be used in the 
construction, alteration or repair of any mining claim, building, wharC bridge, 
ditch, dike, flume, tunnel, fence, machinery, railroad, wagon road, aqueduct to 
create hydraulic power or any other structure, or who grades, fills in, levels, 
surfaces or otherwise improves any land, or who performs labor in any mine or 
1 Section 3 of the 1893 session laws also contained a provision for a lien conceming land which contains similar 
language to the 1951 amendment: "Any persoll who at the request of the owner of any lot in any incorporated city or 
town grades. fills in, or otherwise improves the same or the street in front of or adjoining the same, has a lien upon 
such lot for his work done or material furnished." 1893 Sess. Laws, p. 50. This provision is substantially codified as 
Idaho Code § 45-504. 
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mining claim, and eve,)' pnifessional engineer or licensed surveyor under contract 
'who prepares or furnishes designs, plans, plats, maps, specifications, drcrwings, 
s'urveys, estimates of cost, on site observation or supervision, or who renders any 
other professional service whatsoever for tvhich he is legally authorized to pelform 
in connection 'wilh any land or building development or improvement, or to 
establish boundaries, has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done "or 
professional services" or materials furnished, whether done or furnished at the 
instance of the owner of the building or other improvement or his agent; and every 
contractor, sub-contractor, architect, builder or any person having charge of any 
mining or of the construction, alteration or repair either in whole or in part, of any 
building or other improvement, as aforesaid shall be held to be the agent of and 
owner for the purpose of this chapter: provided, that the lessee or lessees of any 
mining claim shall not be considered as the agent or agents of the owner under the 
provisions of this chapter. 
1971 Sess. Laws, ch. 91, § 1, p. 196-97 (emphasis indicates language added by 1971 amendment). 
At the same time the Legislature amended Idaho Code § 45-501 to provide lien rights for 
engineers and land surveyors, the Legislature also amended Idaho Code § 45-506 with new 
language to address priority issues behveen an engineer and a mortgagee as follows: 
The liens provided for in this chapter are preferred to any lien, mortgage or other 
encumbrance, which may have attached subsequent to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was commenced, work done, or materials or professional 
services were commenced to be furnished .... 
197 I Sess. Laws, ch. 91, § 4, p. 198 (emphasis added to reflect the 1971 additions). 
In ruling that the lien of an architect should relate back to when the architect first began to 
supply architectural services, the Court observed that frequently an architect will have devoted 
substantial efforts prior to the commencement of any construction. The Court reasoned that giving 
priority to an intervening mortgagee over an architect who provided architectural services prior to 
construction activities would unfairly deprive an architect of the protection intended by the lien 
statutes. 
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The motion to reconsider is based upon a ruling by District Judge Juneal C. Kerrick in a 
1 
2 
case pending in the Third Judicial District in and for the-County of Canyon. In that decision, 
3 Judge Kerrick ruled that an engineer's lien has priority from the date construction first 
commenced. Tn reaching this conclusion, Judge KelTick relied upon Beall Pipe & Ta/1k CO/po v. 
5 TUll10c Intermountail1, Inc., 108 Idaho 487, 700 P.2d 109 eCL App. 1985). The Beall Pipe case 
I 
6 was an appeal from a dismissal of a materialmen's lien foreclosure action due to an alleged 
7 deficiency in the description ofthe property subject to the lien. The Court of Appeals reversed 
8 
and remanded the case back to the trial court The Court of Appeals gave guidance to the tlial 
9 
court regarding the priority issues that would have to be decided. The Court stated, "[t]he priority 
10 
date of a lien for materials is the date materials 'were commenced to be furnished.'" !d. at 492, 
11 
700 P.2d at 114 (citing Idaho Code § 45-506). 'Ole Court then discussed what the phrase 
12 
13 
"commenced to be flUllished" meant and the Court cited to a California case, Walker v. Lytton 
14 Savings and Loan Ass '1/ a/Northern California, 2 Ca1.3d 152, 84 Cal.Rptr. 521,465 P.2d 497 
15 (1970) for thc proposition that "commenced to be furnished" meant delivery of the construction 
16 materials to the work site, not when a materialman began to prepare the materials for shipment to 
17 the site. 
18 
The Walker case involved a priority dispute between mechanic's lien filed by an architect 
19 
and a mortgagee. The architect completed the plans and drawings prior to any actual constructioll. 
20 
The deed of trust was recorded atter the plans were completed but prior to any construction. The 
21 
architect provided services to the job site after construction commenced. The owner of the 
22 
23 
property failed to pay the debt secured by the mortgage and failed to pay the architect. The trial 
24 court detem1ined that the architect's lien had pliority over the bank. The California Supreme 
25 
I 
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Court reversed, finding that under Califomia Imi the baruc had priority because its mortgage was 
recorded prior to any actual construction activities. Ie!. at 158-59, 84 Cal.Rptr. at 526-27, 465 P.2d 
at 502. Judge Kerrick applied similar reasoning and concluded that the lien of the engineer did 
have any priority until actual construction had begun. 
With ali respect to Judge Kerrick, this COl111 comes to a different conclusion. The Court 
I will note that the language of the controlling California statute was different than the 197 I version 
of the Idaho lien statutes.3 The California statute provided that a lien for services was prefened to 
a mortgage that attached after conunencement of construction. When the Idaho Legislature 
amended the mechanic's lien law to specifically include engineers, the Legislature provided that 
the lien was for the preparation or furnishing of a very wide range of services including "designs, 
plans, plats, maps, specifications, drawings, surveys, estimates of cost" and "any other 
professional service whatsoever." Idaho Code § 45-501. At the same time, the Legislature also 
amended the priority statute to provide that, as between a mortgagee and an engineer, the priority 
of the engineer's lien relates back to the date that "professional services were commenced to be 
furnished." Idaho Code § 45-501. Prior to this change, the priority was measured from the time 
that the construction commenced, work was done on the building, or materials were supplied to 
the site. By providing that an engineer's lien relates back to the time that professional services 
: 'The liens provided for in this chapter, except as otherwise * >;< .. provided, are preferred to any" " * deed of trust, 
or other encumbrance upon the premises and improvements * * * which may have attached subsequent to the time 
when the building, improvement, structure, or work of improvement in connection with which the lien claimant has 
done his work or furnished his material was commenced; also to any * * * Deed of trust, or other encumbrance of 
which the lien claimant had no notice and which was unrecorded at the time the building, improvement, structure, or 
work of improvement * * * was commenced. * * *, Walker v. Lytton Sal'. and Loan Ass '/7 of N. Ca., 2 CaL3d 152,84 
CaLRptr. 521, 465 P.2d 497 (l970)(quoting from Section 1181 oCthe California Code of Civil Procedure). 
3 Compare section 1181.1 of the Code of California Civil Procedure (Stats. 1969, ch. 1382) with Idaho Code § 45-506 
(1971 Sess. Laws, ch. 91, § 4, p. 198.) 
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I wcre first commenced, the Court concludes that the Legislature intended to provide for a lien 
priority for an engineer that was not connected to actual construction activities. Similarly, the 
C01ll1 concludes that the priority for an architect is not dependent upon the date that construction 
activities began. 
Judge Kerrick also cited to Ultrcrwall, Inc. v. Washington Mutual Bank, 135 Idaho 832, 25 
P.3d 855 (2001). In Ultrawall, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that a 
mOl1gagee was entitled to priority over a mechanic's lien claim. The first work on the project was 
done by an engineer. After the engineer's work, banks provided construction loans and recorded 
deeds of trust. After the deeds of trust were recorded, the lien claimant, a sheetrock subcontractor, 
provided labor and material to the project. The lien claimant urged the Court to overrule Pacific 
States m1d find that all mechanic and materialmen's liens should relate back to whenever the first 
work that was done on the project by the engineer. The COUli declined to overrule Pacific States. 
Consistent with the earlier decision in Pacific States, the Comi ruled that the sheetrock 
subcontractor's lien had priority from the date that it first provided labor or material to the job site. 
The sheetrock subcontractor did not have priority from the date that the engineer first furnished 
professional services. 
While the Court in Ultrmvall did not have any issue relating to the priority of an engineer's 
lien claim, the COUli made the following statement: 
In addition, while the statute can be as read as Ultrawall suggests, it can also be 
construed, as it was by the Court in Pactfic States, to mean that the pmiicular lien 
claimant must either commence to furnish professional services such as 
engineering or surveying, commcnce the physical construction of building, 
improvement or structure, or, if that person or entity was not involved with either 
of the above activities, begin to work or furnish materials in order for that 
claimant's lien to attach. In essence, Ultrawall's argument is that a lien claimant 
should be able to bootstrap his claim to the earliest known work on the project. We 
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believe this represents an inequitable approach from the lender's standpoint, 
however; and we are not persuaded that those individuals and entities that have no 
connection with the initial construction of the project, but record their liens after 
the recording of the mortgage, should be paid in advance of the construction lender. 
Jd. at 836. The sheetrock subcontractor in Uill'cnvall attempted to relate the mechanic's lien back 
to the time that the engineer first worked on the project. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme 
Court did not indicate that an engineer did not have a lien from when the engineer first furnished 
professional services. The Supreme Court simply reiterated its prior ruling that a subcontractor 
providing labor or materials has priority ii-om the date that the subcontractor first provided labor or 
I materials, and that the subcontractor cannot bootstrap to the earlier priority date available to 
:0 I another lien claimant. Unlike Judge Kerrick, this Court does not read Ultrawall or Beall Pipe to 
12 
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suggest or find that an engineer's lien cannot have priority until construction activities begin. 
The significant work of an architect, much like the work of the engineer, is almost aiways in 
the planning and development stages of a project, prior to any construction activities. The Court will 
adhere to its earlier ruling that the architect's lien has priority fi"om the date architeci:ural services 
were first provided. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Credit Suisse's motion for reconsideration. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this _-,S:.........._ day of September 2010. 
~" D ll. ~ ~.Owel1 
District Judge 
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